The Supreme Court has held that strong and cogent evidence emerging during trial—such as eyewitness testimony and dying-declaration-equivalent statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC—can justify summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, even if they were not chargesheeted.
The Bench clarified that statements of the deceased recorded during treatment, though made weeks before death, constitute admissible dying declarations under Section 32 of the Evidence Act and can be relied upon along with in-court depositions. The delay between the statement and the eventual death does not dilute its evidentiary value, as Section 32 does not require the maker to be under immediate expectation of death.
The Court further held that at the summoning stage, a trial court cannot conduct a mini-trial or discredit testimony based on cross-examination; the standard is higher than framing of charge but lower than conviction. Child-witness testimony and corroborative Section 161 statements can collectively form the required prima facie satisfaction.
Finding that the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 (minor daughter/eyewitness), and the deceased’s statements clearly indicated instigation and active involvement of the husband’s relatives, the Court ruled that the High Court erred in refusing to summon them as additional accused.
Accordingly, setting aside the High Court’s order, the Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh directed that the respondents be summoned to face trial under Section 319 CrPC.
Case Title: Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Citation: 2025 INSC 1386