In a landmark advisory opinion with far-reaching implications for Centre–State relations, the Supreme Court of India on 20 November 2025 delivered its verdict on a Presidential Reference dealing with the constitutional powers of Governors and the President in the process of granting assent to State Bills. The Court answered fourteen questions referred by the President under Article 143(1), following intense constitutional debate triggered by conflicting judicial precedents and the fallout of the earlier decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025).
The reference—labelled by the Court as a “functional reference”—sought clarity on core mechanics of the Constitution: the options available to a Governor under Article 200, the role of the President under Article 201, the extent of judicial review of their actions, the validity of court-imposed timelines for processing Bills, and the controversial concept of “deemed assent.”
Why the Reference Was Made
The President invoked Article 143 after several States complained of Governors sitting indefinitely on Bills. The Supreme Court noted that confusion arose after its April 2025 judgment in the Tamil Nadu case, which had suggested that gubernatorial inaction was justiciable and that timelines could be judicially imposed. Earlier Constitution Bench decisions, however, indicated the opposite. This conflicting judicial landscape led to a constitutional impasse affecting governance across India, prompting the President to seek the Court’s authoritative clarification.
Key Findings of the Supreme Court
1. Governor Has Only Three Constitutionally Valid Options (No “Withhold Assent” Veto)
The Court held that under Article 200, the Governor has only three options:
- Assent to the Bill
- Return the Bill to the Legislature (with a message) if it is not a Money Bill
- Reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration
The Court categorically held that the Constitution does not permit the Governor to “withhold assent” simpliciter as an independent option. The first proviso to Article 200 does not create a fourth option; instead, it qualifies the Governor’s ability to withhold and requires that any such withholding must occur through a return for reconsideration.
2. Governor Is Not Bound by Aid and Advice When Exercising Article 200 Options
The Court held that while the Governor ordinarily acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers, the specific discretion under Article 200 is of a constitutional nature, and therefore not mechanically bound by ministerial advice when choosing among the three options.
However, the Court clarified that this discretion must remain constitutional, not political.
3. Governor’s Decision Is Not Justiciable — But Prolonged, Unexplained Inaction Can Be Judicially Checked
The Court rejected the earlier view in Tamil Nadu that gubernatorial decisions under Article 200 are justiciable.
It held that:
- Courts cannot review the merits of a Governor’s assent, reservation, or return.
- But if the Governor does nothing for an indefinite, unexplained period, courts may issue a limited mandamus directing the Governor to take a decision, without dictating which one.
4. Article 361 Protects the Person of the Governor — Not the Constitutional Office
The Court emphasised that personal immunity under Article 361 does not shield the office of the Governor itself from judicial scrutiny in cases of unconstitutional inaction.
Thus, while the Governor cannot be made a party or summoned, their office can be directed to act.
5. Supreme Court Rejects Judicially Imposed Timelines
In major departure from the Tamil Nadu decision, the Court held:
- It is unconstitutional for courts to impose rigid timelines for Governors or the President.
- The framers deliberately omitted timelines from Articles 200 and 201, relying instead on “constitutional trust” and institutional comity.
The only explicit timeline in this area is the Legislature’s 6-month period to reconsider a Bill returned by the President (Proviso to Article 201).
6. President’s Role Under Article 201 Is Also Discretionary and Non-Justiciable
The Court held that:
- The President’s assent or decision to return a Bill is not subject to judicial review.
- The President is not required to seek the Supreme Court’s opinion each time a Bill is reserved.
7. “Deemed Assent” Has No Place in the Constitution
In a significant ruling, the Court held that the Constitution does not permit any form of “deemed assent”—neither for the Governor nor the President.
No Bill becomes law automatically due to delay.
8. Courts Cannot Review Bills Before They Become Law
The Court declared that judicial review cannot be triggered when a Bill is still pending with the Governor or the President. Any review of legislative content must wait until the Bill becomes an Act.
Impact on Federalism and Governance
The judgment restores a careful balance between:
- Legislative supremacy of States,
- Discretionary constitutional roles of Governors and the President, and
- Judicial restraint in matters of legislative procedure.
By clarifying that assent decisions are not subject to merits review, the Court reinforced federal comity, but also ensured that Governors cannot paralyse State legislation through inaction.
The decision also resolves uncertainty created by the Tamil Nadu ruling, re-aligning the law with earlier Constitution Bench judgments.
Final Directions and Outcome
The Bench—comprising CJI B.R. Gavai, and Justices Surya Kant, Vikram Nath, P.S. Narasimha, and Atul Chandurkar—issued a consolidated set of answers to all 14 questions, forming a comprehensive constitutional framework for State legislation assent procedures.
The Court returned a few questions unanswered (e.g., relating to Article 145(3) and certain broad aspects of Article 142), noting they were either irrelevant or too abstract for the advisory jurisdiction.
Conclusion
This advisory opinion is one of the most consequential constitutional rulings of the decade. It clarifies how State Bills move through the Governor and President, restores stability to the federal structure, removes the uncertainty created by conflicting judgments, and establishes that neither constitutional functionary can be compelled by judicial timelines—yet neither can they stall governance through indefinite inaction.
Newspapers and constitutional scholars have already described the decision as a “reset button” on the functioning of Article 200 and Article 201, offering clarity essential for the functioning of India’s democracy.